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Much of the debate about the impact of China on the international political economy arises from 
the many dimensions of the potential impact and the lack of historical precedent for such a large 
change. This paper provides some context for thinking about these issues by contrasting China’s 
recent expansion with the USA at the end of the last great wave of globalization, and reviewing 
recent quantitative modelling of China’s growth on other countries. It argues that China’s growth is 
good for the world economy with significant terms-of-trade gains being experienced in its trading 
partners, reductions in poverty and increases in living standards. Nevertheless it also suggests we 
should be cautious in predicting China’s future role in the world economy. It still commands only a 
fraction of the spending power of the USA and further growth will require China to embrace good 






For the average person in a rich country like the USA, the bundle of goods consumed is around 
thirty times larger than the bundle of goods consumed in the world’s poorest countries. This 
enormous gap arose after the 1870’s where a select group of countries successfully industrialized 
and experienced 100 years of historically unprecedented high growth rates. 
The remarkable transformation that we see occurring in China is the latest example of one country, 
out of only a few, being able to bridge the gap between these two groups. Other notable post WWII 
examples of catch-up were Japan, South Korea and several other east Asian economies. However 
many countries’ attempts at industrializing since WWII failed, and China was nearly among them. 
But thirty years of relative political stability and market reforms have given China a fair chance of 
bridging the chasm. 
As China undertakes this catch-up growth it is becoming economically and politically much more 
important to the rest of the world. This chapter aims to give some context to China’s economic 
emergence by considering other major economic changes in the world economy. First I review the  
way the world economy has grown over time and hence how the current gap in real incomes has 
come into being. I also look at how the USA industrialized and draw out some important parallels 
with China’s current experience. Third, in order to begin thinking about China’s impact in 
quantitative terms we need some understanding how large it is economically, which is not as 
straightforward as it might appear. So in Section 4 of this chapter I consider alternative measures of 
its size and also trace the growth of China through time and consider how China now, compares 
with other large countries at various stages of their economic development.  
Thought size is important, this chapter also aims to show that size alone is not a sufficient condition 
for a countries growth to have a big impact on the world economy. That depends also on how 
different that country is from the rest of the world. It is possible to be big, but remain unimportant 
in an economic sense. Section 5 of this chapter therefore considers how different China is in an 
economic sense, from the rest of the world economy, and shows why China’s growth therefore 
matters for some regions more than others.  
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2. China’s Place in the Word Economy 
For most of human history a large fraction of all returns to labour was spent on food, particularly 
carbohydrates. Thus historical records on rice and bread consumption tell us a great deal about the 
average level of real incomes through the ages, where “real income” means a bundle of goods -  
shelter, clothing, food - that the average person could afford to buy. Based on these types of records 
it is possible to reconstruct estimates of GDP per capita back until the earliest human records. As 
shown in Figure 1, Maddison (2010) estimates suggest that there was very little growth in average 
real incomes per person from 1 AD to 1800. Clarke (2007) provides even more detailed estimates 
from 1000 BC to now, which shows periods of fluctuations, but no net growth until 1820. The data 
thus suggest that one would be indifferent between living as an Elizabethan era peasant, or a 
peasant under Roman occupation.  
This highlights the significance of the Industrial revolution. In the early 1800’s incomes finally 
began rising. In 1820, a growth rate which we now take for granted, say 2-3 percent per year, was 
historically unprecedented. Before 1820s, the average long run in income per person in England, 
and everywhere else, was close to zero. 
At first glance this might seem surprising given the enormous technological advances that have 
occurred. Rather, as noted by Malthus (1798), the benefits of technological advances such as 
bronze, coal power, iron, steel, and literacy were diluted by higher fertility rates. Even now in the 
poorest countries, population growth rates tend to outstrip growth. The “great divergence” shown, 
after the industrial revolution, was caused when a number of countries managed to escape the 
Malthusian trap, through particularly fast economic growth. Technological change was so fast that 
fertility rates could not keep up. Eventually rising wages and falling mortality rates would cause 
fertility rates to fall.  
Thus, the current gap in incomes across countries is a consequence of the industrial revolution 
which represents an enormous break in history. Some countries, by chance or design, inherited the 
institutions that supported the industrial revolution - such as legal systems that protect property 
rights, effective laws governing individual freedom, and low taxation and escaped the Malthusian 
trap. Thanks to the Malthusian trap, Clarke (2007) estimates average incomes in the world’s 
poorest countries today to be lower than average incomes in Europe in 1000 BC.   
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3. Deep Impact 
A brief list of China’s current economic challenges would include: over population; mass 
migration; sustaining high rates of investment, and; the difficulties in coping with infrastructure 
necessary to maintain its growth. Politically there is also a growing sense of nationalism and 
national identity, disquiet about the distribution of the economic gains and about global 
responsibilities. These symptoms, however, not only describe China, but, equally describe the USA 
during the 19
th century. In looking for a point of reference to understand China’s impact, the USA 
is perhaps the only other example of an economy that came from behind to lead the world growth 
tables and was so large as to bring about fundamental change in the world economy.  
Unlike China, the USA was not overpopulated at the time of its industrialization - but Europe was. 
As shown in Figure 2, during and after the Industrial revolution Western economies experienced 
rapid population growth and China’s share of world population fell steadily after 1820. Despite the 
over-population growth in Europe that trans-Atlantic immigration flows were trivial at first. In the 
two centuries after the initial European settlements, the number of immigrants was estimated to be 
approximately 400,000, most of whom were slaves (O’Rourke 2002). 
As shipping costs fell, the flows accelerated and between 1820 and 1860 five million migrants 
crossed the Atlantic. By the 1840s, the free inflow had increased to 179,000 per annum  and 
between 1820 and 1914 sixty million Europeans emigrated to the New World (Hatton and 
Williamson 1998, O’Rourke 2002, Chiswick and Hatton 2002). This flow represented 
approximately 4% of the world’s population in 1900. The largest fraction was free migrants and the 
peak flow was in 1907 when one million immigrants arrived in a single year. 
In addition to this was the forced migration of slaves from Africa, at a rate of around 60 000 per 
year in the 1820s and migrants from other countries. Thus in 1820 the population was 10 million, 
and 1920 the USA accounted for 106 million people. (O’Rourke 2002, Chiswick and Hatton 2002). 
Maddison’s data, in Figure 3, show that this episode of mass migration took the USA from being an 
insignificant fraction of the world population in 1800 to being 5% of the world population by 1900.  
To get a sense of this economic achievement, and compare it with China today, we need to 
compare real incomes across countries using a “real basket of goods” concept. Maddison (2010)  
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does this using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars to convert the nominal GDP per capita of 
one country into an equivalent bundle of goods n a second country.
1  
Figure 4 thus shows GDP per person in $PPP for the UK, China and the USA. It shows that the 
USA caught up very rapidly and had passed the UK by 1900. The graph also emphasizes the higher 
growth rate of China compared to earlier industrial revolutions and also the suddenness of the 
change compared to the UK and the USA. In terms of this real output measure, China’s per capita 
wealth today as is about as high today as the USA was in 1940. It passed the USA’s 1900 wealth 
level in 2001, so that it has achieved in a decade, the same increase in living standards that the USA 
achieved in four decades. 
To gain a sense of China’s presence in the world economy we might consider looking at total GDP, 
rather than GDP per capita. Figure 5 shows that, according to Madison’s data, in terms of the total 
quantity of goods and services produced, China is now the equal of the USA. There is reason to 
believe that this comparison is incorrect for many purposes and I shall return to this point below. 
But taking these numbers at face value,  it is interesting to observe that the current parity is, in fact, 
a return of the situation that existed in 1900 when the USA caught up with China in terms of its real 
GDP!  
Note also that, by the outbreak of WWII, when the USA was regarded by many as only a potential 
industrial giant, its capacity was three times larger than that of China. By 1950 WWII industrial 
efforts had doubled this advantage to six times that of China, a position which was held until the 
end of the Cultural Revolution. The graph therefore highlights the remarkable long run 
performance of the USA economy in terms of sustained economic growth. The USA’s enormous 
impact on world political economy must be seen as a consequence of its huge economic size, which 
was achieved in part through population growth, but mostly through long run sustained increases in 
living standards. 
Historians debate over the significance of these events and the reasons for the USA’s success. 
Nevertheless the USA was not a fountain of technological knowledge, at least until the end of the 
19
th century. Even then, for example though USA steel manufacturing was more efficient than in 
                                                            
1 Specifically, the numbers should be thought of as an index of a representative bundle of goods and services (e.g. 
goods, haircuts food, legal services clothing, etc) that can be purchased by all residents of each country. If two 
countries have the same $PPP value of GDP it means that total volume of goods produced by these economies is the 
same. If they have the same GDP per person then, roughly speaking, living standards are the same.  
5 
 
Britain, most of the key discoveries and inventions relating to steel came from Britain (Nelson 
1989). Far more important was the abundance of land, as evidenced by the rapidly rising land 
prices (see Williamson 1997), and relative economic freedom. Another fact that stands out about 
the USA’s growth experience is the total lack of planning. Arguably the key to the USA’s success 
was the opportunity for private investment and intuitions to maintain and protect these investments.  
China also owes its growth to these factors since its growth acceleration commenced after the end 
of the Cultural Revolution. What has been important for China’s emergence is not technological 
sophistication or planning but the increased economic opportunities. For example labour migrated 
to the USA initially because there was nobody there already with the power to stop it. But mass 
migration eventually caused a 70% fall in wages relative to farm incomes, which in turn lead to 
growing resistance to further migration and eventually to the anti-immigration legislation in the 
early 1900’s (Timmer and Williamson 1998).  
For China, economic growth also sparked mass migration. But barriers to migration to the cities, 
such as household registration system, were erected and became a source of enormous inequality. 
The household registration system is an example of the force of entrenched interest groups in 
driving economic policy. As China develops we should expect increasing economic frictions 
spillover into policy making. Consider, for example, the impact of rising wages in China. Currently 
China’s comparative advantage in manufactured exports is due to its low wages. China’s ongoing 
economic success will increase labour costs and means that China will increasingly have to 
compete on the basis of productivity rather than low wages. This is a good thing for China as it 
means increasing living standards. But it will also mean a huge sorting out between efficient and 
inefficient firms. Exporters will seek subsidies. Domestic firms will lobby for protection. If market 
forces do not adjust quickly, rising unemployment and dissatisfaction will emerge.  
So, like the USA, China’s emergence on the world stage has been associated with new economic 
freedom and opportunity. World history and China’s history itself suggest that the sources of 
growth lie in economic freedom of opportunity combined with good intuitions for protecting 
property rights. China has done very well with only a modest endowment of these ingredients. 
China’s future will depend in large part in how it deals with these types of growing pains.   
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4. How Big is China Now? 
The data presented in Figure 5 suggested that, in economic terms, today China’s GDP today is 
approximately the same size of the USA. These Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) numbers are 
notoriously unreliable however. The 2005 PPP data produced by the World Bank International 
Comparison Project (ICP) show China's GDP being 5.3B $PPP and the USA economy being 12.3B  
$PPP, so that China is only half the size of the USA by their measure.
2  
But, arguably, what matters from an economic perspective is not the total volume of goods 
produced in China, but China’s capacity to supply on the world market and its capacity to demand 
goods produced in the world market. A great deal of effort has been made by economists to 
undertake PPP benchmarking exercises because it was long realized that exchange rate 
comparisons made developing countries look much poorer than they were. The corollary is that 
PPP comparisons rates make China look much bigger in the world economy than what it would be 
if we simply compared the value of GDP produced by China, converted to USA dollars using the 
exchange rate.  
To see why, consider the example of a non-traded service, say haircuts. Someone who has $1 in 
China could convert it to, say, 6 RMB, and buy a can of cola. Or they could perhaps buy a haircut. 
The same person with $1 in the USA could also buy a cola, but a haircut might cost $30-$60. So 
the same dollar buys much less in the USA. PPP comparisons would recognize that the person in 
China with $1 is much wealthier in a real sense than the person in the USA, because she can 
purchase more goods and services. Thus PPP measures of GDP are used by economists and groups 
like the World Bank and the OECD to look at comparisons of welfare on a per capita basis. 
But is this the right metric to measure the impact of the Chinese economy of the world economy? Is 
it a measure of China’s total capacity to demand goods or supply goods on the world economy? 
The answer is no. PPP comparisons tell us about the capacity to produce both traded and non-
traded goods. But they do not tell us the value of goods that can be purchased in a foreign country 
for a given number of Yuan. That depends simply on the exchange rate which gives a very different 
measure of China’s size. Using exchange rates, the Chinese GDP is only 2.4 billion US dollars. By 
this measure USA GDP is five and a half times larger than China’s in 2005. In 2009 the figure had 
fallen substantially with the USA being approximately 3 times larger than China.  But, to put it 
                                                            
2 Data are from  http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp  
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more dramatically, this nevertheless means that the USA’s annual product can currently buy out 
China’s annual product three times over.  
The reason for the large difference between these valuations of China’s relative economic power is 
that, though China produces a large volume of goods and services, many of these are non-traded 
goods that have very little value on world markets. For example, is the international value of a 
Chinese haircut that costs 6 RMB really $30? Thus in an economic sense, China’s clout on the 
world stage is much better measured by its relative GDP measured on an exchange rate basis, than 
by the PPP comparison. 
An alternative measure of China’s impact on the world economy is simply the value of its supply 
on the world market through its export share, relative to other countries exports. Alternatively one 
could measure China’s influence on world markets by looking at its total buying power, i.e. its total 
import share of world trade. In terms of its supply impact on the world economy, China is currently 
nearly as large as the USA with export values currently about 84% of the USA’s export value. In 
terms of its demand impact of the world economy, however, China is 56% of the USA’s value.  
So, due to China’s large trade surplus, China’s impact on world supply would appear to be much 
larger than its impact on world demand. But export values are likely to overstate the true supply 
impact of China on the world economy since they contain a very high fraction of imported 
components. The actual contribution of Chinese production to world supply is only the value added 
by the Chinese production, for example, at the assembly stage if all components are imported. A 
recent study suggests that around 50% of the value of Chinese exports are re-exported components 
imports (Koopman et al 2008). Because the value of Chinese exports includes these high value 
imports, its actual contribution to world trade is much less than the gross trade to GDP figures.  
So China’s economy is growing rapidly and it is large by any measure. Nevertheless the data 
suggest that’s its economic impact is still considerably smaller than that of the USA.   
5. China’s Impact on World Prices 
So far we have considered China’s size but we have not discussed how China’s growth is affecting 
other countries. This will depend on China’s impact on world prices. Being large is a necessary 
condition to have an impact on world prices, but it is not a sufficient condition. It is possible to be 
large but remain unimportant in the world economy because a country’s impact on world prices 
also depends on the bias of its growth. That is, an economy’s impact on the world economy,  
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through changing commodity prices, depends on how it is changing relative world supplies of 
commodities. Though China’s growth is always good for the Chinese, its impact on incomes in 
other countries primarily depends upon its ability to change the world relative demand and world 
relative supply and hence to change the world terms-of trade.  
By this measure China can be expected to have a large impact on some regions because it has 
dramatically increased the world supply of certain specific commodities - firstly textiles, and in the 
last decade, consumer durables. Thus, whether a country gains or not from China’s expansion 
depends on the extent to which that country imports the goods that China is producing more 
cheaply, and the extent to which they export goods which China is not producing.  
It is these terms-of-trade effects that are the focus of much of the international computable general 
equilibrium modeling literature. Recent results from studies by Harris, Robertson and Xu (2010) 
and Robertson and Xu (2010) suggest that China has had a strong positive impact on growth in the 
world economy, but particularly in Asia. Figure 6 shows the results for three regions, the USA, 
Japan plus the NICs (that is Japan plus the Newly Industrialized Countries of, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and the ASEAN-4 region (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and 
Philippines).  
The values reported in Figure 6 show the percentage increase in GDP, and other indicators such as 
wages and consumption, arising in these regions purely as a result of China’s growth. Specifically 
they shows the estimated impact of a decade of Chinese growth in which China’s economy 
increased by approximately 100% and its trade share increased even faster, by about 150%. It 
shows that growth improves the USA’s terms of trade and raises GDP in the USA by about 3% 
over the decade.  But the gains to Japan and the NICs are much larger at 13% of GDP.  
This reinforces the previous points about China’s size. China is a large country and its growth has 
had positive terms of trade effects for countries like the USA. But China is much more important as 
a regional economic power and has had an enormous impact on the Asian economies, particularly 
the more developed Asian economies that are more integrated with China. Second it shows that 
China’s growth has been positive for all of these regions, even the ASEAN region which is often 
thought to be suffering from Chinse competition (for examples see Lall and Albaladejo, 2004, 
Eichengreen, Rhee and Tong 2007). Though competitive forces exist, the results emphasise the 




China thus stands on the brink of economic development in much the same way as the USA did at 
the start of the 20
th century. In the USA there was disquiet about its role in the world and its global 
responsibilities. WWII, the decline of the British Empire, and the cold war thrust the USA 
unwillingly onto the international stage. But who, in the late 1800’s, could foresee all of these 
events. Presumably China will find its own path to responsible leadership in the world economy. 
But just as it would have been difficult to predict how the USA’s world leadership would emerge at 
the start of the 20
th century, we should be cautious in prescribing any particular role in the world 
economy for China.  
A key insight that emerges from the preceding comparison of alternative measures of “economic 
impact” is that the Chinese economy, despite its enormous population advantage over the USA, still 
commands only a fraction of the spending power of the USA economy today. In particular, China’s 
buying power on the world economy is much smaller than the USA - and this matters a great deal 
for the political influence it can exert and the extent to which it can be held responsible for 
international economic trends. In particular, China has some way to go yet in order match the USA 
in terms of sheer economic magnitude, and much further still in terms of per capital incomes. The 
evidence from both China and the USA points to relatively free markets with good institutions as 
being the main sources of growth. But the lack of economic freedom and lack of democratic 
institutions compared to the USA warrants a healthy degree of concern over the size of the 
development task that lies before it. If China does not continue to embrace market systems there is 
good reason to expect its growth to stall.  
What is more certain is that Chinese economic growth has been good for the Chinese, with massive 
reductions in poverty and rising living standards. Moreover, China is now a very large regional 
power and the preceding discussion has provided evidence that it is having a very large growth 
effect on its neighboring trade partners. If China continues its path of stable growth there is every 





Chiswick, B. and Hatton, T. J. (2002). “International Migration and the Integration of Labor 
Markets” IZA Discussion paper 559, August 2002. 
Clark, G. (2007), A Farewll to Alms: A Brief History of the World, Princeton University Press. 
Eichengreen, Barry, Rhee, Yeongseop and Tong, Hui (2007) “China and the Exports of Other 
Asian Countries”, Review of World Economics , 143, 2, 201-26. 
Harris, Richard G., Peter E. Robertson and Jessica Xu, (2010) “The International Effects of China’s 
Growth, Trade and Education Booms” University Of Western Australia Business School, 
Economics Discussion Paper 10.04. 
Hatton, T.J. and J.G. Williamson. (1998). The Age of Mass Migration: An Economic Analysis.New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, (2009) Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
August 2009.  
Koopman, Robert, Zhi Wang abd Shang-Jin Wei “How Much Of Chinese Exports Is Really Made 
In China? Assessing Domestic Value-Added When Processing Trade Is Pervasive”, NBER 
Working Paper 14109. 
Lall, S. and Albaladejo, M. (2004) “China’s competitive performance: a threat to East Asian 
manufactured exports”, World Development, 32, 9, 1441–66. 
Maddison, Angus (2010) Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD, 
The Groningen Growth and Development Centre, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ (accessed 25 
June 2010) 
Malthus, Thomas (1798) An Essay On The Principle Of Population As It Affects The Future 
Improvement Of Society, J. Johnson London  
Nelson, Richard R. (1990) “U.S. technological leadership: Where did it come from and where did it 
go?” Research Policy, 9 117-132.  
11 
 
O’Rourke, Kevin H. “Europe and the causes of globalization, 1790 to 2000 in H. 
Kierzkowski (ed.), From Europeanization of the Globe to the Globalization of Europe (Palgrave, 
2002). 
Robertson, Peter E. and Jessica Xu, (2010) “In China’s Wake: Has Asia Gained From China’s 
Growth ” Mimeo, Economics , University Of Western Australia Business School. 
Timmer, A. and Williamson, J. G. (1998). ‘Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties: Labor 
Markets, Policy Interactions and Globalization Backlash. Population and Development Review 24: 
739-71. 
World Bank, (2010) World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, (accessed 
25 June 2010 
Williamson Jeffrey G.  (1997) “Globalization and Inequality. Past and Present”, The World Bank 




Figure 1: World Real GDP per Capita 
 




0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
World GDP Per Capita 1990 Int. GK$



















Figure 3: Share of World Population. 
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Figure 4: GDP per Person ($PPP) 
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Figure 5: GDP ($PPP) 
 








































ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
2009 
DP 
NUMBER  AUTHORS TITLE 
09.01  Le, A.T.  ENTRY INTO UNIVERSITY: ARE THE CHILDREN OF 
IMMIGRANTS DISADVANTAGED? 
09.02  Wu, Y.  CHINA’S CAPITAL STOCK SERIES BY REGION AND SECTOR 
09.03  Chen, M.H.  UNDERSTANDING WORLD COMMODITY PRICES RETURNS, 
VOLATILITY AND DIVERSIFACATION 
09.04  Velagic, R.  UWA DISCUSSION PAPERS IN ECONOMICS: THE FIRST 650 
09.05  McLure, M.  ROYALTIES FOR REGIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 
09.06  Chen, A. and Groenewold, N.  REDUCING REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN CHINA: AN 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES 
09.07  Groenewold, N. and Hagger, A.  THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION: 
SIMULATION RESULTS FROM A SMALL CGE MODEL. 
09.08  Clements, K. and Chen, D.  AFFLUENCE AND FOOD: SIMPLE WAY TO INFER INCOMES 
09.09  Clements, K. and Maesepp, M.  A SELF-REFLECTIVE INVERSE DEMAND SYSTEM 
09.10  Jones, C.  MEASURING WESTERN AUSTRALIAN HOUSE PRICES: 
METHODS AND IMPLICATIONS 
09.11  Siddique, M.A.B.  WESTERN AUSTRALIA-JAPAN MINING CO-OPERATION: AN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
09.12  Weber, E.J.  PRE-INDUSTRIAL BIMETALLISM: THE INDEX COIN 
HYPTHESIS 
09.13  McLure, M.  PARETO AND PIGOU ON OPHELIMITY, UTILITY AND 
WELFARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC FINANCE 
09.14  Weber, E.J.  WILFRED EDWARD GRAHAM SALTER: THE MERITS OF A 
CLASSICAL ECONOMIC EDUCATION 
09.15  Tyers, R. and Huang, L.  COMBATING CHINA’S EXPORT CONTRACTION: FISCAL 
EXPANSION OR ACCELERATED INDUSTRIAL REFORM 
09.16  Zweifel, P., Plaff, D. and 
Kühn, J. 
IS REGULATING THE SOLVENCY OF BANKS COUNTER-
PRODUCTIVE? 
09.17  Clements, K.  THE PHD CONFERENCE REACHES ADULTHOOD 
09.18  McLure, M.  THIRTY YEARS OF ECONOMICS: UWA AND THE WA 
BRANCH OF THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY FROM 1963 TO 1992 
09.19  Harris, R.G. and Robertson, P.  TRADE, WAGES AND SKILL ACCUMULATION IN THE 
EMERGING GIANTS 
09.20  Peng, J., Cui, J., Qin, F. and 
Groenewold, N. 
STOCK PRICES AND THE MACRO ECONOMY IN CHINA 
09.21  Chen, A. and Groenewold, N.  REGIONAL EQUALITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
CHINA: IS THERE A TRADE-OFF?  
19 
 
ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
2010 
DP 
NUMBER  AUTHORS TITLE 
10.01  Hendry, D.F.  RESEARCH AND THE ACADEMIC: A TALE OF 
TWO CULTURES 
10.02  McLure, M., Turkington, D. and Weber, E.J.  A CONVERSATION WITH ARNOLD ZELLNER  
10.03  Butler, D.J., Burbank, V.K. and  
Chisholm, J.S. 
THE FRAMES BEHIND THE GAMES: PLAYER’S 
PERCEPTIONS OF PRISONER’S DILEMMA, 
CHICKEN, DICTATOR, AND ULTIMATUM 
GAMES  
10.04  Harris, R.G., Robertson, P.E. and Xu, J.Y.  THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF CHINA’S 
GROWTH, TRADE AND EDUCATION BOOMS 
10.05  Clements, K.W., Mongey, S. and Si, J.  THE DYNAMICS OF NEW RESOURCE PROJECTS 
A PROGRESS REPORT 
10.06  Costello, G., Fraser, P. and Groenewold, N.  HOUSE PRICES, NON-FUNDAMENTAL 
COMPONENTS AND INTERSTATE SPILLOVERS: 
THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
10.07  Clements, K.  REPORT OF THE 2009 PHD CONFERENCE IN 
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
10.08  Robertson, P.E.  INVESTMENT LED GROWTH IN INDIA: HINDU 
FACT OR MYTHOLOGY? 
10.09  Fu, D., Wu, Y. and Tang, Y.  THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND 
INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS ON EXPORT 
PERFORMANCE 
10.10  Wu, Y.  INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
CHINA 
10.11  Stephens, B.J.  THE DETERMINANTS OF LABOUR FORCE 
STATUS AMONG INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS 
10.12  Davies, M.  FINANCING THE BURRA BURRA MINES, SOUTH 
AUSTRALIA: LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS AND 
RESOLUTIONS 
10.13  Tyers, R. and Zhang, Y.  APPRECIATING THE RENMINBI 
10.14  Clements, K.W., Lan, Y. and Seah, S.P.  THE BIG MAC INDEX TWO DECADES ON 
AN EVALUATION OF BURGERNOMICS 
10.15  Robertson, P.E. and Xu, J.Y.   IN CHINA’S WAKE:  
HAS ASIA GAINED FROM CHINA’S GROWTH? 
10.16  Clements, K.W. and Izan, H.Y.  THE PAY PARITY MATRIX: A TOOL FOR 
ANALYSING THE STRUCTURE OF PAY 
10.17  Gao, G.  WORLD FOOD DEMAND 
10.18  Wu, Y.  INDIGENOUS INNOVATION IN CHINA:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
10.19  Robertson, P.E.  DECIPHERING THE HINDU GROWTH EPIC 




10.21  Widmer, P.K., Zweifel, P. and Farsi, M.  ACCOUNTING FOR HETEROGENEITY IN THE 
MEASUREMENT OF HOSPITAL PERFORMANCE 
10.22  McLure, M.  ASSESSMENTS OF A. C. PIGOU’S FELLOWSHIP 
THESES 
10.23  Poon, A.R.  THE ECONOMICS OF NONLINEAR PRICING: 
EVIDENCE FROM AIRFARES AND GROCERY 
PRICES 
10.24  Halperin, D.  FORECASTING METALS RETURNS: A BAYESIAN 
DECISION THEORETIC APPROACH 
10.25  Clements, K.W. and Si. J.  THE INVESTMENT PROJECT PIPELINE: COST 
ESCALATION, LEAD-TIME, SUCCESS, FAILURE 
AND SPEED 
10.26  Chen, A., Groenewold, N. and Hagger, A.J.  THE  REGIONAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A 
REDUCTION IN CARBON EMISSIONS 
10.27  Siddique, A., Selvanathan, E.A. and 
Selvanathan, S. 
REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH, 





ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
2011 
DP 
NUMBER  AUTHORS  TITLE 
11.01  Robertson, P.E.  DEEP IMPACT: CHINA AND THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
11.02  Kang, C. and Lee, S.H.  BEING KNOWLEDGEABLE OR SOCIABLE? 
DIFFERENCES IN RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF 
COGNITIVE AND NON-COGNITIVE SKILLS 
11.03  Turkington, D.  DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF MATRIX CALCULUS 
11.04  Golley, J. and Tyers, R.  CONTRASTING GIANTS: DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE  
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN CHINA AND 
INDIA 
11.05  Collins, J., Baer, B. and Weber, E.J.  ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EVOLUTION: 
PARENTAL PREFERENCE FOR QUALITY AND 
QUANTITY OF OFFSPRING 
11.06  Turkington, D.  ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE LOG 
LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION USING MATRIX 
CALCULUS 
11.07  Groenewold, N. and Paterson, J.E.H.  STOCK PRICES AND EXCHANGE RATES IN 
AUSTRALIA: ARE COMMODITY PRICES THE 
MISSING LINK? 
11.08  Chen, A. and Groenewold, N.  REDUCING REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN CHINA: IS 
INVESTMENT ALLOCATION POLICY EFFECTIVE? 
11.09  Williams, A.,  Birch, E. and Hancock , P.  THE IMPACT OF ON-LINE LECTURE RECORDINGS 
ON STUDENT PERFORMANCE 
11.10  Pawley, J. and Weber, E.J.  INVESTMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN THE 
G7 COUNTRIES AND AUSTRALIA 
    
 